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Abstract
This paper examines the nancial and real e¤ects of excess reserves in a New Keyne-
sian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopoly banking,
credit market imperfections and a cost channel. The model explicitly accounts for
the fact that banks hold excess reserves and they incur costs in holding these assets.
Simulations of a shock to required reserves show that although raising reserve require-
ments is successful in sterilizing excess reserves, it creates a procyclical e¤ect for real
economic activity. This result implies that nancial stability may come at a cost of
macroeconomic stability. The ndings also indicate that using an augmented Taylor
rule in which the policy interest rate is adjusted in response to changes in excess re-
serves reduces volatility in output and ination but increases uctuations in nancial
variables. To the contrary, using a countercyclical reserve requirement rule helps to
mitigate uctuations in excess reserves, but increases volatility in real variables.
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1 Introduction
Excess reserves have been a common feature of the banking system of many countries across
the world.1 In developed countries, the phenomenon of excess reserves has become more
apparent since the global nancial crisis. For instance, in the case of the United States,
the sharp increase in excess reserves since 2008 occurred because risk averse banks stopped
lending to each other and engaged in liquidity hoarding (see Ashcraft et al. (2009), Hilton
and McAndrews (2010) and Jenkins (2010)). Others argued that the policy initiatives
undertaken by the Federal Reserve in response to the crisis caused the quantity of bank
reserves to surge (see Keister and McAndrews (2009) and Ennis and Wolman (2012)).
Similarly, excess reserves have been growing rapidly in commercial banks in the Euro Area
since the onset of the global economic crisis (see European Central Bank (2008) and Sol
Murta and Garcia (2009)).
In developing economies, the problem of excess reserves is more prevalent. For several
years, the banking system of some developing countries has recorded high persistent liq-
uidity. For instance, Figure 1 shows the excess liquidity situation in three small developing
countries. Inspection of the data reveals that excess reserves have been greater than 15
percent for most of the period in Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, and above 25 percent in
Jamaica. Given its importance to the monetary transmission process, several researchers
have empirically examined the determinants of excess liquidity in developing economies.
Contributions along these lines include Maynard and Moore (2005) for Barbados, Saxe-
gaard (2006) for Sub-Saharan Africa, Khemraj (2007, 2009) for Guyana, Anderson-Reid
(2011) for Jamaica, Pontes and Sol Murta (2012) for Cape Verde, Jordan et al. (2012) for
The Bahamas and Primus et al. (forthcoming) for Trinidad and Tobago. In most cases,
these studies show that excess reserves appear to be a structural phenomenon.2
As highlighted in Agénor and El Aynaoui (2010), the reasons for excess liquidity can
be categorised into structural and cyclical factors. One structural factor is a low degree of
1 In most nancial systems, excess liquidity refers to the maintenance by banks of a higher level of funds
than is normally required to meet their statutory reserve requirements and settlement balances. Excess
liquidity (or excess reserves) is measured as the di¤erence between total bank reserves and required bank
reserves. For this reason, the terms excess liquidity and excess reserves are used interchangeably in the
literature.
2Excess bank liquidity is also a problem for large developing countries, such as Brazil, Russia, India,
China and Nigeria. Some of the other developing countries with the problem of excess reserves include
Botswana (see Akinboade and Zachariah (1997)), Egypt (see Fielding and Shortland (2005)), Mexico (see
Jallath-Coria et al. (2005)), Tanzania (see Aikaeli (2006)), Turkey (see Tabak and Bankasi (2006)), Fiji
(see Jayaraman and Choong (2012)), Indonesia (see Bathaluddin et al. (2012)), Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic (see Deléchat et al. (2012)).
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nancial development. Therefore, excess liquidity tends to be more persistent in countries
with underdeveloped nancial markets, such as ine¢ cient payment systems, or an under-
developed market for government securities (see Saxegaard (2006)). Another structural
factor is a high degree of risk aversion. In an environment of increased uncertainty, risk
averse banks charge a high risk premia to reduce demand for loans and to safeguard their
loan portfolio. This leads to a voluntary build-up of excess liquid assets.3
Regarding the cyclical factors, one of the main sources of excess reserves is foreign
currency inows (Heenan (2005) and Ganley (2004)). Current account inows arise mainly
through revenues received from commodity exports. Therefore, exporters of minerals, such
as Botswana, and oil exporting economies, such as Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago,
observe huge surpluses in their current account when commodity prices are high on world
markets. Particularly in oil-producing countries, a rise in oil prices results in an increase in
government revenues. In many cases, these energy windfalls are used to nance an increase
in government spending. As a result, the banking system of these economies holds large
quantities of involuntary excess liquidity.4 Capital account inows may arise from aid-
related transfers, foreign direct investment and portfolio inows. Another cyclical cause of
excess liquidity is ination. Because ination leads to higher volatility in relative prices
and an increase in riskiness of investment projects, it raises uncertainty about the value
of collateral. This causes banks to demand a higher risk premium, which increases the
lending rate. The higher loan rate can lead to a contraction in credit demand and increase
excess reserves.
In an attempt to withdraw excess liquidity from the nancial system, central banks have
used open market operations, and issued central bank bills.5 Central banks have also issued
long-term securities (bonds) and implemented special deposit facilities. In addition, reserve
requirements6 have been used frequently to manage liquidity.7 For instance, between 2006
3Similarly, in a crisis environment where banks perceive an increase in the risk of default on loans, they
may be unwilling to lend. For instance, Agénor et al. (2004) found that the contraction in bank credit and
the associated increase in excess reserves in Thailand following the Asian nancial crisis in the late 1990s
resulted from supply related factors, which emanated from the banks.
4According to Agénor and El Aynaoui (2010, p. 923), involuntary excess liquidity is "the involuntary
accumulation of liquid reserves by commercial banks". Several researchers have examined the issue of
involuntary excess liquidity. See for instance, Saxegaard (2006), Bathaluddin et al. (2012) and Primus et
al. (forthcoming).
5See Nyawata (2012) for a discussion of the pros and cons of using treasury bills and central bank bills
to absorb liquidity.
6Reserve requirement levels vary greatly across countries. It has been observed that these ratios are
generally higher in developing countries, when compared to developed countries (see Appendix D).
7 In recent years, a number of central banks have used reserve requirements as a liquidity management
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and 2009, the central banks of China, India and Trinidad and Tobago have all increased
reserve requirements to mop up excess liquidity. Using reserve requirements can help the
central bank or the government to reduce the quantity of excess reserves in the nancial
system without incurring interest costs, which are associated with the issuance of securities
(Gray (2011)). Also, reserve requirements can be more e¤ective because selling securities to
sterilize excess liquidity can in fact be self-defeating as it can cause market interest rates to
increase and stimulate capital inows, thereby making the excess liquidity problem worse if
to begin with it resulted from large inows (Lee (1997)). One disadvantage to note however
is reserve requirements act as a tax on the nancial sector (Central Bank of Trinidad and
Tobago (2005) and Montoro and Moreno (2011)).
In the presence of excess liquidity, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy can be limited
or asymmetric. As empirically documented in Lebedinski (2007) for Morocco, when banks
hold excess reserves they are more likely to respond in an asymmetric manner when adjust-
ing deposit rates. Therefore, following an increase in the renance rate or a reduction in
the required reserve ratio, banks may not raise deposit rates. As a result, a contractionary
monetary policy may be less e¤ective in reducing ination (Agénor and El Aynaoui (2010)).
Furthermore, when banks hold excess liquidity, an expansionary monetary policy may not
be successful in stimulating bank credit.8
Despite the impact excess reserves can have on the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, there have been few attempts to examine the role of reserves in a New Keynesian
general equilibrium framework.9 This paper contributes to the existing literature by ex-
plicitly modeling excess reserves in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
framework with monopoly banking, credit market imperfections and a cost channel. The
model extends and modies the framework in Agénor and Alper (2012), and integrates
aspects of Agénor et al. (2013) and Glocker and Towbin (2012). In this framework, the
bank holds excess reserves and there are convex costs associated with holding these re-
serves as in Glocker and Towbin (2012). The central bank sets its policy interest rate,
using a Taylor-type rule. Therefore, this framework can be applied to other high- and
tool. See Montoro and Moreno (2011), Robitaille (2011) and Tovar et al. (2012) for further discussions.
8This is particularly important when banks hold excess reserves for precautionary purposes. In this case,
an expansionary monetary policy will only raise the amount of excess reserves further, and will not help to
expand credit.
9Christiano et al. (2010) and Samake (2010) incorporated excess reserves into a general equilibrium
model with banking. However, both studies did not model the fact that banks incur costs in holding these
reserves. It is important to have a well-dened demand for excess reserves to explicitly account for the rate
of return on reserves and any opportunity cost of holding reserves.
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middle-income countries, where the nancial system is su¢ ciently developed so monetary
policy can operate through the manipulation of a short-term interest rate.
The model is used to examine the nancial and real e¤ects of a productivity shock,
an increase in the policy interest rate, a shock to the reserve requirement ratio and an
exogenous increase in bank liquidity. Also, simultaneous shocks are applied to deposits and
reserve requirements to examine whether increasing required reserves in response to a surge
in liquidity is an e¤ective measure. This experiment is one of the key contributions to this
paper. Although it has been often observed in practice that raising reserve requirements
can indeed o¤set an increase in liquidity, this is the rst attempt to model this in a New
Keynesian general equilibrium framework. In addition, we investigate the responses of the
variables in the model following a liquidity shock when two alternative policy rules are used:
an augmented Taylor rule in which the central bank adjusts its policy rate in response to
changes in excess reserves, and a countercyclical rule in which the reserve requirement ratio
reacts to deviations in excess reserves.
The model is calibrated based on Trinidad and Tobago data due to the fact that excess
reserves have been growing very rapidly in that country. The results show that a negative
supply shock and a contractionary monetary shock have the traditional e¤ects. In the
former case prices increase and output declines, while in the latter both ination and output
fall. As the renance rate rises following both types of shocks, the opportunity cost of
holding excess reserves increases. The ndings also indicate that although a positive shock
to required reserves is successful in reducing excess reserves, the e¤ect is expansionary for
real economic activity. In the case of a liquidity shock, a simultaneous increase in reserve
requirements can assist in reducing the quantity of excess reserves in the nancial system.
Furthermore, when an augmented Taylor rule which includes excess reserves is used, a
liquidity shock has a less dampening e¤ect on real variables but increases uctuations in
nancial variables. To the contrary, using a countercyclical reserve requirement rule has
the opposite e¤ect for both real and nancial variables.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section
3 outlines the symmetric equilibrium. The key steady-state and log-linearized equations
of the model are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides a discussion of the calibration
for a high-income country. In Section 6, impulse response functions are used to discuss the
ndings from the policy experiments and other shocks to the model. Section 7 examines
the dynamic e¤ects of an increase in excess reserves with alternative policy rules. The nal
section provides a summary of the main results.
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Figure 1. The Percent of Excess Reserves to Total Reserves in Various Countries10
Source: Central Bank of Belize.
Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago.
Source: Bank of Jamaica.
10 In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, prior to January 2006 excess liquidity is measured by commercial
banksholdings of special deposits. This is therefore taken into account in computing excess reserves before
2006 (see Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago MPR (2007)).
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2 The Model
Consider an economy which contains seven classes of agents: identical innitely-lived house-
holds indexed by h 2 [0; 1], a nal good-producing rm, a continuum of intermediate good-
producing rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1], a capital good producer, a commercial bank (a bank,
for short), the central bank (whose responsibility is to regulate the commercial bank) and
the government.
Households consume and supply labour to intermediate good-producing rms. House-
holds also choose the real levels of cash, deposits and government bonds to hold at the be-
ginning of the period. Each household supplies labour to the intermediate good-producing
rm which it owns. Intermediate good-producing rms use the labour provided by house-
holds and capital (which is rented from the capital good producer) to produce a unique
good that is sold on the monopolistically competitive market. The pricing mechanism of
Rotemberg (1982) is used to account for the fact that intermediate good-producing rms
incur a cost in adjusting prices. The nal good-producing rm aggregates imperfectly
substitutable intermediate goods into a single nal good which is used for consumption,
investment or government spending. The nal good is sold at a perfectly competitive price.
The capital good producer purchases the nal good for investment and combines it with
existing capital stock to produce new capital goods. In this model, wages are fully exible
and adjust to clear the market.
The commercial bank, which is owned by households, supplies credit in advance to in-
termediate good-producing rms to nance their short-term working capital needs. Owing
to the fact that these loans are short-term in nature, we assume that they do not carry any
risk. The bank also supplies credit to the capital good producer for investment nancing.
The banks supply of loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate. These loans
are extended prior to production or investment and are repaid at the end of the period.
The bank pays interest on household deposits and central bank loans. In addition, the
bank is required to hold minimum reserves against deposits at the central bank, and it has
an explicit demand for excess reserves. Total reserves at the central bank are remunerated
at the reserve rate denoted by iMt . The bank determines the total reserve ratio, the deposit
rate and the lending rate, and borrows from the central bank to nance any shortfall in
funding. The central bank supplies all the credit demanded by the bank at the prevailing
renance rate. It is important to note that because there is a perfectly elastic supply of
liquidity, the bank is not subject to (random) withdrawal risk which has been a key factor
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in reserve management models.11 Therefore, increased uncertainty about the size of cash
withdrawals does not inuence the quantity of excess bank reserves in this model.
2.1 Households
Each household, h, chooses consumption, labour supply to intermediate good-producing
rms and real monetary assets. The objective of a representative household is to maximize
the following utility function,
U = Et
1X
t=0
t
[Cht]
1  1
1   1 + N ln(1 Nht) + X lnXht; (1)
where Cht is household consumption, Nht is the share of total time endowment (normalized
to unity) household h spent working, Xht is a composite index of real monetary assets,
 > 0 gives the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, N ; X > 0 are
preference parameters with respect to leisure and money holdings respectively,  2 (0; 1)
is the discount factor and Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information
available at the beginning of period t.
The composite monetary asset is a combination of real cash balancesMHht and real bank
deposits Dht, which can be represented by the following Cobb-Douglas function,
Xht = (M
H
ht )
D1 ht ; (2)
where  2 (0; 1).
Real wealth of household h at the end of period t, Aht, is given by,
Aht =M
H
ht +Dht +B
H
ht; (3)
where BHht denotes holdings of one-period real government bonds.
At the beginning of period t, each household enters with MHht 1 level of cash. Holding
money balances yield no return, while deposits and government bonds yield gross returns
of (1+iDt ) and (1+i
B
t ), respectively. Therefore, the total real returns from holding deposits
and government bonds from period t   1, adjusted for the rate of ination, are denoted
respectively by (1+ iDt 1)Dht 1
Pt 1
Pt
and (1+ iBt 1)BHht 1
Pt 1
Pt
, where Pt represents the price
of the nal good.
In addition, households supply labour to intermediate good-producing rms, for which
they receive a total real factor payment !tNht, where !t denotes the economy-wide real
11 In reserve management models, optimal reserves are a function of deposit uctuations (see Morrison
(1966), Poole (1968) and Baltensperger (1980) for further discussions).
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wage. Each household owns an intermediate good-producing rm so all the prots made
by that rm, JIht, are paid to the respective household. Also, each household receives a
xed fraction 'h 2 (0; 1) of the banks prots, JBt , and the capital good producers prots,
JKt , with
R 1
0 'hdh = 1. Each household is also required to pay a lump-sum tax, whose real
value is Tht.
The real budget constraint of household h is,
MHht +Dht +B
H
ht  !tNht   Tht +MHht 1(
Pt 1
Pt
) + (1 + iDt 1)Dht 1(
Pt 1
Pt
) (4)
+(1 + iBt 1)B
H
ht 1(
Pt 1
Pt
) + JIht + 'hJ
B
t + J
K
t   Cht:
Each household maximizes lifetime utility with respect to Cht, Nht, MHht , Dht and B
H
ht,
taking iDt , i
B
t , Pt, and Tht as given. Maximizing (1) subject to (4) yields the following rst
order conditions,12
C
 1=
ht = Et

(Cht+1)
 1=(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
)

; (5)
Nht = 1  N (Cht)
1=
!t
; (6)
MHht =
X(Cht)
1=(1 + iBt )
iBt
; (7)
Dht =
X(1  )(Cht)1=(1 + iBt )
iBt   iDt
; (8)
where t+1 = (Pt+1   Pt) =Pt is the ination rate. The transversality condition is deter-
mined by the following equation,
lim
s!1Et+st+s
s(MHt+s) = 0: (9)
Equation (5) is the standard Euler equation which describes the optimal consumption
path. Equation (6) represents the optimal labour supply which is positively related to the
real wage and negatively related to consumption. Equation (7) shows that the demand for
real cash balances depends positively on consumption and negatively on the opportunity
cost of holding cash (measured by the rate of return on government bonds). Equation (8)
denotes the real demand for deposits which is positively related to consumption and the
deposit rate, and negatively related to the bond rate.
12Details of all derivations are shown in Appendix A.
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2.2 Final Good-Producing Firm
The nal good producer assembles a continuum of imperfectly substitutable intermediate
goods Yjt, indexed by j 2 (0; 1), to produce the nal good Yt, which is used for private
consumption, government consumption and investment. The production technology for
combining intermediate goods to produce the nal good is given by the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) technology,
Yt =
Z 1
0
[Yjt]
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
; (10)
where  > 1 represents the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
Given the prices of intermediate goods, Pjt, and the nal good price, Pt, the nal good-
producing rm chooses the quantities of intermediate goods to maximize its prots. The
prot maximization problem of the nal good producer is given by,
max
Yjt
Pt
Z 1
0
[Yjt]
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
 
Z 1
0
PjtYjtdj: (11)
The rst-order condition with respect to Yjt is,
Yjt = (
Pjt
Pt
) Yt: (12)
Equation (12) gives the demand for each intermediate good j. Substituting (12) in (10)
and imposing a zero-prot condition, the nal good price is represented by,
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pjt)
1 dj
1=(1 )
: (13)
2.3 Intermediate Good-Producing Firms
Each intermediate good-producing rm, j, produces a perishable good which is sold on a
monopolistically competitive market. To produce these goods, each rm rents capital at
the price rKt from the capital good producer and combines it with labour. The technology
faced by each intermediate good-producing rm is given by the Cobb-Douglas production
function,
Yjt = AtK

jtN
1 
jt ; (14)
where Njt is household h = j labour hours, Kjt is the amount of capital rented by the rm,
 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to capital and At is a serially uncorrelated
11
technology shock which follows a rst-order autoregressive process, At = A
A
t 1 exp
 
At

,
where A 2 (0; 1) and At  N(0; A).
In order to pay wages in advance, rm j takes a loan from the bank at the beginning
of the period. The amount borrowed is,
LF;Wjt = 
W!tNjt; (15)
where LF;Wjt represents the real value of loans demanded by intermediate good producers
for all t  0 and W 2 (0; 1). Similar to Agénor et al. (2013), it is assumed that short-term
loans for working capital do not carry any risk and are therefore contracted at a rate that
reects only the marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank, iRt , which is the renance
rate. The wage bill, inclusive of interest payments is (1 + iRt )
W!tNjt + (1   W )!tNjt.
Rearranging this gives (1+W iRt )!tNjt, which shows the rms wage bill includes a constant
share of nancing of working capital needs. Thus, W indicates the strength of the cost
channel; if W = 0, no cost channel exists.
Intermediate good producers solve a two stage problem. In the rst stage, given input
prices, rms integrate capital and labour in a perfectly competitive market in order to
minimize their total costs. The cost minimization problem for rm j is,
min
Njt;Kjt

(1 + W iRt )!tNjt + r
K
t Kjt

: (16)
Minimizing (16) subject to (14), the rst-order conditions with respect to Njt and Kjt
equate the marginal products of capital and labour to their relative prices, from which the
capital-labour ratio is obtained,
Kjt
Njt
= (

1  )[
(1 + W iRt )!t
rKt
]: (17)
The unit real marginal cost is,
mcjt =

(1 + W iRt )!t
1 
(rKt )

(1  )1 At : (18)
In the second stage, each rm chooses prices, Pjt, to maximize the discounted real
value of current and future prots. Nominal price stickiness is introduced along the lines
of Rotemberg (1982), by assuming that intermediate good-producing rms incur a cost in
adjusting prices. These price adjustment costs, PACjt, which are measured in terms of
aggregate output, Yt, take the form,
PACjt =
F
2

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1
2
Yt; (19)
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where F  0 is the degree of price stickiness.
Thus, the prot maximization problem for the intermediate good producer is,
max
Pjt
Et
1X
t=0
ttJ
I
jt; (20)
where tt is the rms discount factor for period t, with t representing the marginal
utility gained from consuming an additional unit of prot. Real prots, JIjt, are dened as,
JIjt = Yjt  mcjtYjt   PACjt: (21)
Substituting (12) and (19) in (21) and taking mcjt, Pt and Yt as given, the rst-order
condition with respect to Pjt is,
(1  )t

Pjt
Pt
  Yt
Pt
+ tmcjt

Pjt
Pt
  1 Yt
Pt
  tF

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1

Yt
Pjt 1

(22)
+FEt
(
t+1

Pjt+1
Pjt
  1
 
Pjt+1
P 2jt
!
Yt+1
)
= 0:
Equation (22) gives the adjustment process of the nominal price Pjt. When there is no
price adjustment cost (F = 0), the price equals a mark-up over the real marginal cost,
Pjt =


   1

mcjtPt: (23)
In a symmetric equilibrium Pjt = Pt for all j; hence the real marginal cost equals the
reciprocal of the mark-up, mct =
( 1)
 .
2.4 Capital Good Producer
In the economy, all the capital is owned by the capital good producer who employs a linear
production function to produce capital goods. As in Agénor et al. (2013), at the beginning
of each period, the capital good producer purchases It of the nal good from the nal good
producer. Because payments for these nal goods must be made in advance, the capital
good producer borrows from the bank,
LF;It = It; (24)
where LF;It denotes real loans made to the capital good producer for investment purposes.
The total costs faced by the capital good producer at the end of period t for buying an
amount It of the nal good is (1 + iLt )It, where i
L
t is the lending rate.
13
The capital good producer combines undepreciated capital from the previous period,
with investment to produce new capital goods. New capital goods, denoted as Kt+1, are
given by,
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt   K
2

Kt+1
Kt
  1
2
Kt; (25)
where Kt =
R 1
0 Kjtdj,  2 (0; 1) gives the constant rate of depreciation and K > 0
measures the magnitude of adjustment costs. The capital good producer rents the new
capital stock to intermediate good-producing rms at the rate rKt .
The capital good producer chooses the amount of capital stock in order to maximize the
value of the discounted stream of dividend payments to the household. The optimization
problem of the capital good producer is given by,
max
Kt+1
Et
1X
t=0
ttJ
K
t ; (26)
where real prots, JKt , can be denoted as,
JKt = r
K
t Kt   (1 + iLt )It: (27)
Maximizing (26) subject to (25), the rst-order condition is,
Etr
K
t+1 = (1 + i
L
t )Et

1 + K(
Kt+1
Kt
  1)

(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
)

(28)
 Et
(
(1 + iLt+1)
"
(1  ) + K
2
[

Kt+2
Kt+1
2
  1]
#)
:
Equation (28) shows the expected rental rate of capital is a function of the current
and expected loan rates, the cost of adjusting capital across periods, the bond rate, the
depreciation rate and the ination rate. The opportunity cost of investing in physical
capital is measured by the real rate of return on government bonds. If the capital good
producer does not borrow at the beginning of the period, and there are no adjustment
costs (K = 0),
Etr
K
t+1 = Et(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
)  1 + : (29)
Equation (29) is the standard arbitrage condition which implies that capital is produced
up to the point where the (expected) rental rate of capital is equal to the (expected) real
interest rate on government bonds, plus depreciation.
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2.5 Commercial Bank
The bank receives deposits Dt from households at the start of each period. These deposits
are used to nance loans to intermediate good-producing rms to cover wage payments
and to the capital good producer for investment. Therefore, combining (15) and (24), total
lending, LFt , in real terms is,
LFt = 
W!tNt + It: (30)
Given householdsdeposits and total loans to rms, to nance any shortfall in funding,
the bank borrows from the central bank, LBt , for which it pays a net interest rate i
R
t .
Assets of the commercial bank at the beginning of period t consist of real loans to rms
and real total reserve holdings, TRt, whereas its liabilities comprise of real loans from the
central bank and real deposits. The banks balance sheet is thus,
LFt + TRt = L
B
t +Dt: (31)
Total reserves comprise of excess reserves, ERt, and required reserves, RRt, which are
the compulsory minimum amount of reserves the bank must hold at the central bank.
Thus,
TRt = ERt +RRt; (32)
where total reserves are a portion TRt of deposits and required reserves are a percent t of
deposits. Therefore, TRt = TRt Dt and RRt = tDt; where 
TR
t , t 2 (0; 1). Using these
in (32), excess reserves are therefore determined residually,13
ERt = (
TR
t   t)Dt: (33)
Reserves held at the central bank are remunerated at the rate iMt ,
14 where iMt < i
R
t .
The bank therefore chooses the total reserve ratio, the deposit rate and the lending rate to
maximize its present discounted value of real prots. Hence, the banks prot maximization
problem is,
max
fTRt ;1+iDt ;1+iLt g
Et 
1X
t=0
ttJ
B
t ; (34)
13 In principle, the bank should determine directly excess reserves; however, it is more convenient to solve
for total reserves rst, and use this solution to determine excess reserves.
14A few studies have discussed how interest on reserves can be used as a policy instrument (see Goodfriend
(2002), Ennis and Weinberg (2007), Keister et al. (2008), Keister and McAndrews (2009), and Kashyap
and Stein (2012)).
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where, Et  is the expectations operator based on information available at the beginning of
period t and JBt represents real bank prots at the end of period t. Therefore, expected
real bank prots can be dened as,
Et 
 
JBt

= (1 + W iRt )L
F;W
t +Q
F
t (1 + i
L
t )L
F;I
t + (1 QFt )CKt (35)
+(1 + iMt )TRt   (1 + iDt )Dt   (1 + iRt )LBt   (TRt   t)Dt;
where C 2 (0; 1) and QFt 2 (0; 1) is the repayment probability.
From equation (35), the rst term on the right-hand side, (1 + W iRt )L
F;W
t , shows
repayment on loans to intermediate good-producing rms. The second term, QFt (1 +
iLt )L
F;I
t , represents expected repayment on loans to the capital good producer, providing
that there is no default. The third term, (1   QFt )CKt, denotes the banks earnings in
case of default, where 1   QFt represents the probability of default. This term therefore
shows real e¤ective collateral, given by a fraction
 
C

of the real capital stock. The
expression (1 + iMt )TRt denotes the principal plus interest gained from total reserves,
whereas (1+iDt )Dt represents the principal and interest paid on real deposits, and (1+i
R
t )L
B
t
reects the gross repayments to the central bank. Similar to Glocker and Towbin (2012),
the nal term, (TRt  t)Dt, is included to represent the convex costs of holding reserves,
which are proportional to the amount of real deposits. Thus,
(TRt   t) =  C1(TRt   t) +
C2
2
(TRt   t)2 + "Rt : (36)
From equation (36), C1 and C2 are cost function parameters. The linear term,
C1(
TR
t   t), determines steady-state deviations from the required reserve ratio. A pos-
itive deviation from the ratio may generate small benets because holding excess reserves
reduces the costs of liquidity management. Intuitively, if the bank fails to meet the reserve
requirement it has to face the penalty rate for funds borrowed from the central bank. The
quadratic term, C22 (
TR
t  t)2, indicates that negative deviations from the required ratio
may generate large costs. For instance, the central bank may impose a higher penalty rate
in cases where there are large negative deviations from its target, and at the same time,
cease remuneration of excess reserves.15 The last term, "Rt , represents a cost shock.
From the balance sheet constraint (31), and given that LFt and Dt are determined by
the private agentsbehaviour, borrowing from the central bank can be solved for residually.
Therefore, using TRt = TRt Dt in (31) yields,
LBt = L
F
t   (1  TRt )Dt: (37)
15These responses, however, are not explicitly accounted for in the model.
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Using TRt = TRt Dt and substituting (36) and (37) in (35) gives the banks static
optimization problem,
max
fTRt ;1+iDt ;1+iLt g
f(1 + W iRt )LF;Wt +QFt (1 + iLt )LF;It + (1 QFt )CKt (38)
+(1 + iMt )
TR
t Dt   (1 + iDt )Dt   (1 + iRt )

LFt   (1  TRt )Dt
 
 C1(TRt   t) +
C2
2
(TRt   t)2 + "Rt

Dtg:
The rst-order condition with respect to TRt is,
TRt = t +
 
1 + iMt

+C1  
 
1 + iRt

C2
:
The di¤erence between the total reserve ratio and the required reserve ratio TRt   t,
represents the excess reserve ratio, ERt , which is given by,
ERt =
 
1 + iMt

+C1  
 
1 + iRt

C2
: (39)
The rst-order condition with respect to 1 + iDt is,
(1 + iMt )
TR
t (
@Dt
@
 
1 + iDt
)  (1 + iDt )( @Dt@  1 + iDt ) Dt
+(1 + iRt )(1  TRt )(
@Dt
@
 
1 + iDt
)  ()( @Dt
@
 
1 + iDt
) = 0;
using D = (
@Dt
@(1+iDt )
)(
(1+iDt )
Dt
) to represent the constant interest elasticity of the supply of
deposits by the household results in,
1 + iDt = (1 +
1
D
) 1[(1 + iRt )  TRt (iRt   iMt ) (40)
+C1(
TR
t   t) 
C2
2
(TRt   t)2]:
The rst-order condition with respect to 1 + iLt is,
QFt L
F;I
t +Q
F
t (1 + i
L
t )
@LF;It
@(1 + iLt )
  (1 + iRt )
@LF;It
@(1 + iLt )
= 0;
using L =
@LF;It
@(1+iLt )
(1+iLt )
LF;It
to denote the interest elasticity of demand for loans for investment
yields,
1 + iLt =
1 + iRt
QFt [
 1
L + 1]
: (41)
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Equation (39) represents the banks excess reserve ratio. This shows that ERt increases
with iMt but falls with i
R
t . Therefore, the excess reserve ratio is decreasing in the spread
between the interest rate on reserves and the renance rate. By holding an additional
unit of excess reserves at the central bank, the bank benets by gaining 1 + iMt ; at the
same time, it saves because it does not have to borrow from the central bank to meet
reserve requirements. By contrast, the bank also incurs costs for holding the extra unit
of excess reserves. Therefore, equation (39) balances the costs and the benets of holding
excess reserves. From equation (40), the (gross) interest rate on deposits depends on the
marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank, which is lowered in the presence of
remunerated reserves by the di¤erence between the renance rate and the interest rate on
reserves. The deposit rate also depends on the costs associated with holding excess reserves.
Equation (41) shows that the (gross) lending rate depends positively on the marginal cost
of borrowing from the central bank and negatively on the repayment probability, QFt .
As in Agénor and Alper (2012), the repayment probability is taken to depend posi-
tively on "micro" and "macro" factors, namely, the real e¤ective collateral-loan ratio and
economic activity. Therefore, QFt increases with the collateral provided by rms and falls
with the amount borrowed. Hence,
QFt = 0
 
CKt
LF;It
!1 
Yt
Y
2
; (42)
where 0; 1; 2 > 0 and (Yt=Y ) represents the output gap, with Y denoting the steady-
state value of output16 under fully exible prices.
2.6 Central Bank
The central banks assets consist of government bonds, BCt , and loans to the commercial
bank, LBt , whereas its liabilities consist of total reserves, TRt, and currency supplied to
households and rms, M st . Therefore, the central banks balance sheet is given by,
BCt + L
B
t = TRt +M
s
t : (43)
Using TRt = TRt Dt and rearranging, equation (43) becomes,
M st = B
C
t + L
B
t   TRt Dt: (44)
16Similar to other studies (see, for instance, Meh and Moran (2010)), the output gap is measured in terms
of deviations from its steady-state value.
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Equation (44) shows the supply of currency is matched by government bonds and
central bank loans extended to the commercial bank, less the fraction of deposits held at
the central bank.
In this economy, the central bank sets the policy interest rate using a Taylor-type rule
(see Taylor (1993)), and supplies all the liquidity the bank needs through a standing facility.
The policy rule is of the form,
iRt = i
R
t 1 + (1  )[r + t + "1(t   T ) + "2 ln

Yt
Y

] + t; (45)
where  2 (0; 1) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, r is the steady-state value
of the real interest rate on bonds, t represents current ination, T  0 is the central
banks ination target, "1; "2 > 0 measure the relative weights on ination deviations from
its target and the output gap, respectively and t is a serially correlated shock with constant
variance, which follows a rst order autoregressive process of the form,
t = 

t 1 exp (

t) ; (46)
where  2 (0; 1) and t  N(0; ) is a serially correlated random shock with zero mean.
The standard specication (45) will be extended later in the text to include a measure of
excess reserves, in order to examine the dynamic e¤ects of an increase in bank reserves
under an interest rate rule which reacts directly to changes in liquidity.
2.7 Government
The government purchases the nal good, collects taxes, and issues one-period risk-free
bonds, Bt, which are held by the central bank, BCt , and households, B
H
t . Total bonds can
be denoted by, Bt = BCt +B
H
t . The governments real budget constraint is given by,
Bt + Tt + i
R
t 1L
B
t 1
Pt 1
Pt
+ iBt 1B
C
t 1
Pt 1
Pt
  iMt 1TRt 1
Pt 1
Pt
= (47)
Gt + (1 + i
B
t 1)Bt 1
Pt 1
Pt
;
where Gt denotes real government spending and Tt represents real lump-sum tax revenues.
The sum of the terms iRt 1LBt 1
Pt 1
Pt
, iBt 1BCt 1
Pt 1
Pt
and iMt 1TRt 1
Pt 1
Pt
(adjusted for the
rate of ination) comes from the assumption that the net income earned by the central
bank from lending to the commercial bank, holding government bonds and holding reserves
from the commercial bank, respectively, is transferred to the government at the end of each
period.
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Government purchases represent a constant fraction,  2 (0; 1), of output of the nal
good,
Gt =  Yt: (48)
3 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all rms producing intermediate goods are identical so they
produce the same output, and prices are the same across rms. Also, all households supply
the same number of labour hours. Therefore, Kjt = Kt, Njt = Nt, Yjt = Yt, Pjt = Pt, for
all j 2 (0; 1).
It is necessary for equilibrium conditions in the credit, deposit, goods and cash markets
to be satised.17 The supply of loans by the commercial bank and supply of deposits by
households are perfectly elastic at the prevailing interest rates; as a result, the markets for
loans and deposits always clear. To satisfy equilibrium in the goods markets, production
must be equal to aggregate demand. Thus, using (19),
Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
F
2
(
1 + t
1 + 
  1)2Yt: (49)
The equilibrium condition of the market for cash is,
M st =M
H
t +M
F
t ; (50)
where MFt =
R 1
0 M
F
jtdj represents the total cash holdings of intermediate good-producing
rms and the capital producer. It is assumed that bank loans to all rms are extended
in the form of cash such that, LFt = M
F
t . Substituting this in (50), M
s
t = M
H
t + L
F
t .
Replacing M st from (44) gives,
BCt + L
B
t   TRt Dt =MHt + LFt : (51)
Using LBt from (37) into (51) gives,
BCt + (L
F
t + 
TR
t Dt  Dt)  TRt Dt =MHt + LFt ;
or,
B
C
=MHt +Dt: (52)
Given that the total stock of bonds held by the central bank is constant, equation (52)
implies that real cash balances are inversely related to real bank deposits. This equation
also represents the money market equilibrium condition, from which the equilibrium bond
rate is obtained.
17The equilibrium condition of the market for government bonds is eliminated by WalrasLaw.
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4 Steady-State and Log-Linearization
This section presents some of the key steady-state and log-linearized equations of the model.
Further details on all the steady-state equations are shown in Appendix B, whereas the
log-linearized equations are outlined in Appendix C.
Given that the steady-state is characterized by zero ination, from equation (5), the
steady-state value of the bond rate (which is equal to the renance rate) is given by,
1 + iB = 1 + iR = 1 + r =
1

:
The equality between iB and iR implies that the commercial bank has no incentive to
borrow from the central bank in order to buy government bonds.
The steady-state deposit and lending rates are given by,
1 + iD = (1 +
1
D
) 1[(1 + iR)  TR(iR   iM )
+C1(
TR   )  C2
2
(TR   )2];
1 + iL =
1 + iR
QF

 1L + 1
 :
In the steady state, the repayment probability is inversely related to the rms asset
over its liabilities,
QF = 0

CK
LF;I
1
:
The steady-state value of the excess reserve ratio is given by,
ER =
 
1 + iM

+C1   (1 + iR)
C2
:
In order to solve the model, each variable is log-linearized around a non-stochastic,
zero-ination steady-state. The log-linearized deposit rate is denoted by,18
ciDt = 1(1 + iD)(1 + 1D ) 1f 1  TR (1 + iR) biRt   TR^TRt (iR   iM )
+

C1   C2
 
TR     TR^TRt   ^tg:
Log-linearizing the lending rate yields,
biLt = biRt   Q^Ft ;
18The reserve requirement ratio is exogenous in this model. Therefore, ^t = 0 except for the case when
there is a shock to the variable.
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where, a linear approximation of the repayment probability gives,
Q^Ft = 2Y^t + 1

K^t   L^F;It

:
From (39), the log-linearized excess reserve ratio is,
^ERt =
 (1 + iR) biRt
C2 ER
:
Log-linearizing (22) gives the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (see Galí (2008) and Walsh
(2010)), which states that current ination depends on rmsmarginal costs and expected
ination,
^t =
(   1)
F
cmct + Et^t+1:
Log-linearizing equation (18), marginal costs are given by,
cmct = (1  )(W {^Rt + !^t) + ( + 1 +     )r^Kt   A^t:
This equation shows that marginal costs depend positively on the real wage and the
rental rate of capital, and negatively on the aggregate supply shock. Also, because W > 0
based on the calibration, marginal costs are directly a¤ected by changes in iRt (which
represents the interest rate on short-term loans for working capital).
5 Calibration
The model is calibrated for Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) due to the fact that the banking
system in that country has recorded high persistent liquidity. T&T is a high-income devel-
oping economy in the Latin America and Caribbean region (see The World Bank (2012)).
Owing to the fact that T&T is a developing country, it can be di¢ cult to get estimates
for some of the parameters. Hence, in cases where country-specic parameters are not
readily available, we use estimates based on other studies for high- and middle-income
countries. The calibration can therefore be applied to other developing countries that have
the problem of excess bank reserves.
A summary of the parameter values is provided in Table 1. Regarding the parameters
for the household, the steady-state value of beta (quarterly) for T&T is calculated using,
 = 11+r .
19 This gives a value of beta equal to 0:985. The intertemporal elasticity of
19The average real bond rate, r, for the period 2007-2011 is 1:52. Using this value,  is equal to 0:985.
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substitution, , is taken to be 0:5, which is in line with estimates for middle-income coun-
tries (see Agénor and Montiel (2008)). Similar to Agénor and Alper (2012), the preference
parameter for leisure, N , is calibrated at 1:8. The preference parameter for composite
monetary assets, X , is set at 0:02, which is consistent with the values used in existing
studies for other developing countries. Furthermore, the relative share of cash in narrow
money, , is calibrated to be 0:2, consistent with the available data for T&T for the period
2007-2011.
For the production side, the elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, , is 10:0,
which corresponds to a steady-state markup rate of 11:1 percent. The share of capital
in output of intermediate goods, , is 0:3 and is consistent with estimates for developing
countries. The cost channel parameter, W , is set at 0:45.20 Using the method proposed
in Keen and Wang (2007), the value of the adjustment cost parameter for prices, F , is
calculated as 65. As is standard in the literature, the depreciation rate for capital is set
equal to 0:034. Also, the adjustment cost parameter for investment, K , is set at 18.
In considering the parameters characterizing bank behaviour, the e¤ective collateral-
loan ratio C , is set at a value of 0:05 which is consistent with the evidence in T&T.
There is little information on the values for the cost function parameters, C1, and C2.
Hence, these coe¢ cients are calibrated such that the di¤erential between the steady-state
total reserve ratio and the required reserve ratio is 4:5 percent, which is close to the actual
spread observed in the recent data for T&T. Using this approach gives a value of 0:35 for
C1 and 7:5 for C2. The elasticity of the repayment probability with respect to collateral,
1, is set at a relatively low value, 0:02; whereas the elasticity of the repayment probability
with respect to cyclical output, 2, is set as 0:2, as in Agénor et al. (2012).
On the central bank side, the required reserve ratio, , is set at 0:17, as imposed by
the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago according to legislation. Similar to Agénor and
Alper (2012), the lagged value of the policy rate in the interest rate rule, , is set to
0. The calibration therefore implies that there is direct interest rate smoothing from the
central banks policy response. The parameters for the response of the renance rate to
ination deviations from its target and to output growth, "1 and "2, are set to 1:5 and 0:1,
respectively, which are standard values estimated for Taylor-type rules in middle-income
countries. The degree of persistence in the supply shock, A, and the shock to the renance
20We also used a higher value of W (0:9), but found only a marginal impact on the model. Further
empirical testing can be conducted to determine whether the cost channel parameter - which is positive -
is also signicant for T&T (see, for instance, Malikane (2012)).
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rate, , are both set to 0:4. Finally, the share of government spending in output is set at
0:15, which is close to the actual value observed for the period 2007-2011 in T&T.
Table 1. Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
 0:985 Discount factor
 0:5 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
N 1:8 Relative preference for leisure
X 0:02 Relative preference for money holdings
 0:2 Share parameter in index of money holdings
 10:0 Elasticity of demand, intermediate goods
 0:3 Share of capital in output, intermediate good
F 65 Adjustment cost parameter, prices
 0:034 Depreciation rate of capital
K 18 Adjustment cost parameter, investment
C 0:05 E¤ective collateral-loan ratio
C1 0:35 Linear cost function parameter
C2 7:5 Quadratic cost function parameter
1 0:02 Elasticity of risk premium wrt collateral
2 0:2 Elasticity of risk premium wrt cyclical output
W 0:45 Share of nancing working capital
 0:17 Reserve requirement ratio
 0 Degree of persistence in interest rate rule
"1 1:5 Response of renance rate to ination deviations
"2 0:1 Response of renance rate to output growth
A () 0:4 Degree of persistence, supply shock (shock to renance rate)
 0:15 Share of government spending in output
The steady-state deposit rate is set at 1:05 percent, which is the actual value on average
for the period 2007-2011.21 It is important to note that the low deposit rate is due to the
high liquidity environment, which depresses the short-term interest rate.22 Further, the
data show that the prime lending rate for T&T is 10:7 percent on average during 2007-
2011. This value is therefore used for the steady-state loan rate. Banks in T&T earn
no interest on primary reserve requirements. However, the Central Bank pays interest on
secondary reserve requirements.23 These secondary reserve balances are remunerated at
350 basis points below the policy interest rate. The interest rate paid on reserves is set
21This represents the deposit rate announced by commercial banks for ordinary savings.
22Similarly, inspection of the data shows that the rise in excess reserves in the United States and Euro
Area in recent years was associated with a sharp fall in the short-term interest rate.
23E¤ective October 2006, commercial banks were required to hold, on a temporary basis, 2 percent of
prescribed liabilities at the Central Bank. This is an additional measure geared towards tightening liquidity
conditions.
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at a low value of 0:25 percent, which satises the condition that the interest rate on total
reserves is less than the renance rate. The ratio of excess reserves to total reserves in
the steady state is 20:9 percent, which is close to the value observed in the recent data
for T&T. Further, in the steady state, the proportion of deposits held as total reserves
is 21:5 percent. The steady-state value of the repayment probability is 97 percent; this
implies the default probability is around 3 percent. The steady-state ratio of consumption
to output is 68:1 percent, which is close to the value of 66:8 percent for the period 2007-
2011. For the same period, the cash plus deposit to output ratio is 49:3 percent; hence
the steady-state value is set at 45:2 percent, which is a close approximation of the actual
value. Also, in the steady state the ratio of investment to output is set at 16:8 percent,
while the collateral-to-loan ratio is 1:47.
6 Policy Analysis
This section uses impulse response functions to study the dynamic e¤ects of four shocks to
the model. All the gures show the percent deviation of the variables from their steady-
state values, with the exception of the total reserve ratio, ination and the interest rate
variables which are expressed in percentage points. The rst case examines the impact of a
negative supply shock. We then analyse the transmission of monetary policy following an
increase in the central banks renance rate. The next experiment investigates the impact
of a shock to reserve requirements. Following this, we examine the response of the model
to a liquidity shock, taking the form of an increase in bank deposits. Finally, simultaneous
shocks are administered to deposits and the required reserve ratio.
6.1 Negative Supply Shock
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of some of the main variables of the model
following a negative productivity shock. The direct e¤ect of the shock is an immediate
decline in output, and a rise in the marginal production costs, which in turn exerts an
upward pressure on prices. As the rise in ination dominates the fall in output, the policy
rate, which is determined by the Taylor rule, rises as a result. The higher policy rate
leads to a direct increase in the deposit rate, which in turn raises the demand for bank
deposits, and reduces borrowing from the central bank. From the central banks balance
sheet, a fall in loans to the commercial bank reduces the supply of currency, and therefore
to restore equilibrium in the money market, the demand for cash must fall. Because the
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central banks real bond holdings, which determine the total monetary assets, are xed,
the bond rate adjusts to clear the money market. Therefore, to reduce the demand for
cash, the bond rate increases, which, through intertemporal substitution, leads to a fall in
the level of current consumption. Overall, the higher rate of return on deposits and bonds
increases householdsdemand for these nancial assets, and lowers their consumption.
A key point to note is that based on the calibration, the cost channel exists (W > 0).
Therefore, owing to the fact that marginal costs depend directly on the policy interest
rate, an increase in this rate tends to further raise rmsmarginal costs as it increases the
labour costs of production. Furthermore, the increase in the renance rate also translates
to an immediate rise in the loan rate, which lowers the demand for investment and the
level of physical capital over time. The collateral-to-loan ratio increases on impact as loans
for investment fall by more than the value of collateral. Because the collateral e¤ect is
dominated by the cyclical output e¤ect, the repayment probability falls, causing the loan
rate to increase further, which in turn exerts an upward pressure on the rental rate of
capital. Based on the calibration, the higher rental rate of capital o¤sets the fall in the
level of physical capital, the rise in both labour supply and the renance rate, causing real
wages to increase upon the impact of the shock.24 The rise in real wages, in turn, creates
further upward pressure on rmsmarginal costs.
In this model, excess reserves are positively related to their rate of return, but depend
negatively on the renance rate. Therefore, because the interest rate paid on reserves is
xed by the central bank, an increase in the marginal cost of borrowing from the central
bank lowers the level of excess reserves. As the renance rate and the other interest
rates in the banking sector increase, the costs of holding excess reserves are higher. Put
di¤erently, there is a higher opportunity cost of holding excess reserves when the marginal
cost of borrowing from the central bank increases. Thus, provided that the interest rate on
reserves remains unchanged, the rise in other short-term interest rates indicates that banks
can earn a higher return from investing in other assets, so they reduce demand for excess
reserves. Given that the excess reserve ratio decreases, and that the required reserve ratio
remains constant, the total reserve ratio also falls.
24The value of capital, labour supply, the renance rate and the rental rate of capital were calculated.
The results showed that the increase in the rental rate of capital o¤sets the total (negative) value of all the
other variables, bringing about an increase in real wages.
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Figure 2. Negative Supply Shock
(Deviations from Steady State)
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6.2 Monetary Policy Shocks
6.2.1 Increase in Renance Rate
Figure 3 illustrates the general equilibrium e¤ects of a one-percentage point increase in
the renance rate. A rise in the policy interest rate raises the deposit and loan rates
immediately. As in the previous case, the rise in the deposit rate increases households
demand for bank deposits, and reduces their incentive to hold cash. The higher level of
bank deposits lowers both central bank borrowing and the money supply. Consequently,
the government bond rate increases to reduce demand for cash and to restore equilibrium
in the money market. In response to the rise in the bond rate, current consumption and
output fall. At the same time, a higher loan rate leads to a reduction in loans for investment,
which in turn causes the collateral-to-loan ratio to increase. However, as the drop in output
dominates the rise in the collateral-to-loan ratio, the repayment probability falls. In this
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case, real wages fall by more than the value of physical capital, placing downward pressure
on the rental rate of capital. The decline in marginal costs, which results from the drop in
the rental rate of capital and real wages, creates a downward pressure on ination.
Similar to the case of the negative productivity shock, the higher renance rate increases
the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves. As a consequence, the bank demands less
excess reserves. The reduction in the quantity of excess reserves leads to an immediate fall
in the level of total bank reserves.
Figure 3. Increase in Renance Rate
(Deviations from Steady State)
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6.2.2 Increase in Reserve Requirement Ratio
As highlighted in Agénor and El Aynaoui (2010), raising reserve requirements can help to
sterilize excess liquidity. For this reason, many central banks increase the required reserve
ratio to reduce the ratio of excess reserves in the banking system. The required reserve
ratio, t, is exogenous in this model. Therefore, to assess the impact of a one-percentage
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point increase in the minimum reserve requirement ratio, we assume that t is stochastic
and follows a rst-order autoregressive process of the form: t = 

t 1 exp (

t ).
The impulse response functions in Figure 4 show that an increase in reserve require-
ments does indeed lead to a reduction in the excess reserve ratio. In general, because
the required reserve ratio goes up and the excess reserve ratio falls, the net e¤ect on the
total reserve ratio is a priori ambiguous; given our calibration, the net e¤ect is positive,
as shown in the simulations. Because the deposit rate is set as a mark-down on the total
reserve ratio, a rise in total reserves leads to a fall in the interest rate on deposits. Con-
sequently, household deposits fall, while borrowing from the central bank and the money
supply increase. Equilibrium in the money market requires an increase in the demand for
cash, which is brought about through a reduction in the bond rate, which in turn leads to
a higher level of current consumption and output. The policy rate increases in response to
the rise in output. Furthermore, an increase in the marginal cost of borrowing from the
central bank leads to a rise in the loan rate, which results in a higher rental rate of capital,
a decline in investment and a lower capital stock over time. Primarily owing to the higher
rental rate of capital, real wages increase. As observed previously, a higher lending rate
leads to a reduction in investment loans, and a rise in the collateral-to-loan ratio. The
higher output, along with the increase in the collateral-to-loan ratio, cause the repayment
probability to rise. Nevertheless, the increase in the renance rate dominates the response
of the repayment probability, such that the loan rate rises although mitigated due to the
fall in the perception of risk. Marginal costs increase because of three simultaneous e¤ects:
the increase in the renance rate, higher real wages and the rise in the rental rate of capital.
The increase in rmsproduction costs creates an upward pressure on prices, leading to an
amplied rise in the renance rate.
Therefore, similar to the results in Glocker and Towbin (2012), under an interest rate
rule an increase in reserve requirements widens the spread between lending and deposit
rates.25 Owing to the fact that the bank holds excess reserves, it is fully responsive to the
increase in reserve requirements and therefore cuts the deposit rate to induce households
to reduce their demand for deposits. The lower level of deposits, in turn, leads to a lower
ratio of excess reserves, while the fall in the deposit rate stimulates consumption. The
total net e¤ect of the shock on output depends on the relative changes in consumption and
investment. Based on the calibration, the e¤ect of the increase in consumption dominates
25Montoro and Moreno (2011) and Tovar et al. (2012) also pointed out that an increase in required
reserves acts as a tax on banks, so the spread between deposit and lending rates widens.
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the fall in investment, so output rises.26 This implies that changes in reserve requirements
are procyclical, with respect to economic activity.27
Figure 4. Increase in Reserve Requirement Ratio
(Deviations from Steady State)
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26 In the case of a decrease in reserve requirements, the deposit rate rises and the loan rate falls. The
fall in the loan rate increases investment, while the rise in the deposit rate reduces consumption. Usually,
the overall e¤ect brings about a fall in output because the drop in consumption dominates the increase
in investment. The ndings from a study by Areosa and Coelho (2013) showed that a decrease in reserve
requirements caused output to increase. It must however be noted that in their study, the condition specied
for the loan rate (which was not derived optimally) ensured that a lower reserve requirement ratio generated
an overall countercyclical e¤ect.
27See Horrigan (1988) and Baltensperger (1982) for further discussions on the impact of changes in reserve
requirements on economic stability.
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6.3 Liquidity Shock: Increase in Bank Deposits
As illustrated in Figure 5, the direct e¤ect of an exogenous increase in bank deposits is
an immediate rise in the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves. Given that required
reserves remain constant, the increase in excess reserves leads to a rise in total reserves.
The higher level of bank deposits also reduces borrowing from the central bank, thereby
lowering money supply. Similar to the cases of the supply shock and the monetary shock, to
restore equilibrium in the money market, the bond rate rises, which, through intertemporal
substitution, results in a reduction in current consumption and a fall in output. In response
to the drop in output, the policy interest rate falls, leading to a downward pressure on the
loan rate, which in turn reduces the rental rate of capital. A lower rental rate of capital
increases the demand for physical capital and investment. As observed previously, the fall
in the rental rate of capital reduces real wages; in turn, the fall in both variables results in
a drop in the rmsmarginal costs and thus ination. The decrease in prices leads to an
amplied drop in the policy rate. Also, the lower loan rate stimulates investment, leading
to a fall in the collateral-to-loan ratio, which combined with the contraction in output,
cause the repayment probability to fall. The lower renance rate attenuates the response
of the repayment probability to the shock, leading to an amplied decline in the lending
rate.
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Figure 5. Increase in Bank Deposits
(Deviations from Steady State)
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6.4 Simultaneous Shocks to Deposits and Reserve Requirements
The results from the previous sections show that a shock to deposits increases excess
reserves, but a shock to the reserve requirement ratio reduces the amount of excess liquidity
in the banking system. Therefore, this section investigates the impact of simultaneous
shocks to deposits and required reserves. The premise for this experiment is to examine if
there is an increase in excess liquidity, and at the same time the central bank responds in
a non-systematic manner by raising reserve requirements, whether uctuations in excess
reserves can be reduced. Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions of the shock to
deposits alone, and the joint shocks. The results show indeed that when there is a positive
shock to liquidity, and reserve requirements increase at the same time, the volatility in
excess reserves is reduced. Therefore, this nding provides formal evidence (in line with
the practical evidence on central bank policymaking), that raising reserve requirements,
when there is an exogenous increase in liquidity, helps to sterilize excess reserves. It should
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also be noted that under the combined shock, there is lower volatility for the interest rate
variables. Notably, uctuations in ination and output are also reduced.
Figure 6. Increase in Bank Deposits and Simultaneous Shocks to Deposits and Reserve
Requirements (Deviations from Steady State)
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7 Policy Rules for Managing Excess Reserves
This section examines the macroeconomic e¤ects of a liquidity shock when two alternative
policy rules are used - an augmented Taylor rule and a countercyclical rule for the required
reserve ratio.
7.1 An Augmented Taylor Rule
First, we consider the case where the central bank adjusts its policy rate directly in response
to changes in excess reserves. The rationale for this is to examine how e¤ective a policy
rule which responds to uctuations in excess reserves may be in mitigating the volatility in
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the main variables of the model, under a shock to deposits. The augmented interest rate
rule takes the following form,
{^Rt = {^
R
t 1 + (1  )["1(^t) + "2(Y^t) + "3( \ER_TRt)] + t; (53)
where \ER_TRt denotes the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves in log-linear form.
Primus (2012) estimated an augmented Taylor rule for Trinidad and Tobago which in-
cluded a measure of excess reserves. The results from her study showed the relative weight
corresponding to deviations in excess reserves from steady-state, "3, is  0:03. The negative
coe¢ cient indicates that in response to an increase in excess reserves, the central bank low-
ers the policy rate to reduce incentive for banks to hold excess liquidity. Intuitively, if the
penalty rate for not meeting the reserve requirement is low, commercial banks would tend
to reduce their holdings of excess reserves. By contrast, if the penalty rate is high, banks
would voluntarily hold excess reverses as a measure of precaution to avoid any shortfall in
liquidity. A reduction in the policy rate is also expected to lower the deposit rate, which
in turn discourages household deposits.
The estimated value of  0:03 is quite low and had only a marginal e¤ect on the policy
rule and the model by extension. As a result of this, we consider alternative values of
 0:05 and  0:2 for "3. To assess the impact of an augmented policy rule on volatility, we
compare the asymptotic standard deviations and the relative standard deviations of the
main variables in the model under a liquidity shock with the augmented Taylor rule and the
standard Taylor rule (see Table 2). Figure 7 compares the simulations of a shock to deposits
under both rules when "3 is set at  0:2. The results from Figure 7 and Table 2 indicate
that the augmented Taylor rule is e¤ective in reducing the volatility of key macroeconomic
variables such as ination, consumption and output (among other variables) following an
exogenous increase in deposits. In addition, the renance rate, the loan rate, the deposit
rate, the total reserve ratio and the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves are slightly
more volatile. Further, under the augmented rule, the more volatile negative reaction of
the loan rate stimulates investment; as a result, uctuations in investment rise.
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Figure 7. Increase in Bank Deposits under Standard Taylor Rule and Augmented Taylor
Rule (Deviations from Steady State)
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Table 2. Standard Deviations under Standard Taylor Rule and Augmented Taylor Rule
with Increase in Bank Deposits
"3= 0 "3=  0:03 "3=  0:05 "3=  0:2
Variable Sd. Dev. Sd. Dev.* Rel. S.D.** Sd. Dev. Rel. S.D. Sd. Dev. Rel. S.D.
Renance rate 0:0049 0:0049 1:0000 0:0049 1:0000 0:0051 1:0408
Loan rate 0:0046 0:0046 1:0000 0:0047 1:0217 0:0050 1:0870
Bond rate 0:0012 0:0012 1:0000 0:0012 1:0000 0:0011 0:9167
Deposit rate 0:0038 0:0038 1:0000 0:0039 1:0263 0:0040 1:0526
Ination 0:0031 0:0029 0:9355 0:0028 0:9032 0:0018 0:5806
Consumption 0:0021 0:0020 0:9524 0:0019 0:9048 0:0014 0:6667
Total reserve ratio 0:0031 0:0031 1:0000 0:0031 1:0000 0:0032 1:0323
Excess-total reserves 0:0116 0:0117 1:0086 0:0118 1:0172 0:0122 1:0517
Output 0:0016 0:0015 0:9375 0:0014 0:8750 0:0006 0:3750
Investment 0:0001 0:0005 5:0000 0:0008 8:0000 0:0030 30:0000
Rental rate capital 0:0007 0:0007 1:0000 0:0006 0:8571 0:0004 0:5714
Real wage 0:0109 0:0100 0:9174 0:0095 0:8716 0:0051 0:4679
Marginal cost 0:0138 0:0129 0:9348 0:0123 0:8913 0:0077 0:5580
Repayment prob. 0:0003 0:0003 1:0000 0:0003 1:0000 0:0002 0:6667
Collateral-Loan ratio 0:0001 0:0005 5:0000 0:0008 8:0000 0:0030 30:0000
Notes: *Sd. Dev. is the standard deviation; ** Rel. S.D. denotes the relative standard deviation.
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7.2 A Countercyclical Reserve Requirement Rule
In the second case we investigate the macroeconomic e¤ects of a policy rule in which the
required reserve ratio is determined by its previous value, a fraction of its steady-state value,
and deviations in excess reserves. Therefore, in this approach, the required reserve ratio is
endogenous and serves a countercyclical role for managing changes in excess reserves. The
central bank is assumed to set the reserve requirement rule according to the following,
^t = (1  )+ ( \ER_TRt) +  ^t 1; (54)
where  denotes the degree of persistence in the policy rule and , which measures devia-
tions in the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves from its steady-state, is an indicator
of cyclical conditions. There is little information on the values for  and . Our numeric
experiments suggest a value of 0:12 for  , and 0:85 for . Thus, there is a relatively low
degree of persistence in changes of the required reserve ratio. Also, the positive value for 
means that the central bank increases required reserves when there is a rise in excess bank
liquidity.
To assess whether the countercyclical rule can help to reduce volatility, we compare the
asymptotic standard deviations and the relative standard deviations of the main variables
when the reserve requirement ratio is endogenous and exogenous to the model (see Table
3). The impulse response functions in Figure 8 show that the countercyclical reserve
requirement rule is successful in reducing uctuations in excess reserves and total reserves,
but at the expense of ination and output being more volatile. The results also indicate
that the reserve requirement rule has no e¤ect on the other macroeconomic variables in
the model.
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Figure 8. Increase in Bank Deposits when the Reserve Requirement Ratio is Exogenous
and Endogenous (Deviations from Steady State)
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Table 3. Standard Deviations when the Reserve Requirement Ratio is Exogenous and
Endogenous
^t = 0 ^t = (1  )+ ( \ER_TRt) +  ^t 1
Variable Sd. Dev. Sd. Dev.* Rel. S.D.**
Renance rate 0:0049 0:0049 1:0000
Loan rate 0:0046 0:0046 1:0000
Bond rate 0:0012 0:0012 1:0000
Deposit rate 0:0038 0:0038 1:0000
Ination 0:0031 0:0032 1:0323
Consumption 0:0021 0:0021 1:0000
Total reserve ratio 0:0031 0:0024 0:7742
Excess-total reserves 0:0116 0:0078 0:6724
Output 0:0016 0:0017 1:0625
Investment 0:0001 0:0001 1:0000
Rental rate capital 0:0007 0:0007 1:0000
Real wage 0:0109 0:0109 1:0000
Marginal cost 0:0138 0:0138 1:0000
Repayment prob. 0:0003 0:0003 1:0000
Collateral-Loan ratio 0:0001 0:0001 1:0000
Notes: *Sd. Dev. is the standard deviation; ** Rel. S.D. denotes the relative standard deviation.
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8 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine the dynamic e¤ects of excess reserves in a New
Keynesian general equilibrium model with banking. For this purpose, we combine and
extend the framework presented in Agénor and Alper (2012) and Agénor et al. (2013), by
allowing the monopoly bank to hold excess reserves. As in Glocker and Towbin (2012),
the model explicitly accounts for the fact that banks incur convex costs in holding excess
reserves, which are proportional to their deposit holdings. Similar to the practice in a few
countries, the bank receives interest payments on reserves from the central bank. Other
notable features of the model are that it accounts for credit market imperfections and it
incorporates a cost channel because rms must borrow in advance to nance their working
capital needs. Also, the supply of bank loans to rms is perfectly elastic at the prevailing
lending rate, and the central banks supply of liquidity is perfectly elastic at the policy
interest rate.
The model, which was calibrated for Trinidad and Tobago, was used to explain the main
macroeconomic variablesresponses to a negative supply shock, a shock to the renance
rate, a shock to reserve requirements and a liquidity shock. We also examine the case where
there were simultaneous shocks to reserve requirements and liquidity. The simulations
show that under both a negative supply shock and a contractionary monetary shock, the
renance rate increases, leading to a rise in demand for nancial assets such as deposits
and bonds. The higher policy rate also increases the opportunity cost of holding excess
reserves, leading the bank to reduce demand for these assets; as a result, excess reserves fall.
The simulations of the positive shock to the required reserve ratio show that an increase
in reserve requirements leads to an immediate fall in excess reserves. However, although
a higher level of required reserves mitigates the volatility in excess reserves, there is an
expansionary e¤ect on ination and output. The results from the joint shocks indicate that
the impact of an exogenous rise in bank deposits can be less dampening on macroeconomic
variables if the required reserve ratio increases simultaneously. This experiment therefore
supports the decision - which has indeed been practiced by many central banks - to raise
reserve requirements to sterilize excess reserves.
In addition, we examine two policy rules aimed at reducing macroeconomic uctuations
under a liquidity shock: an augmented interest rate rule which includes a measure of
excess liquidity and an endogenous countercyclical reserve requirement rule. Given that
banks have a voluntary demand for excess reserves, the rationale for the rst rule is to
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investigate whether the volatility of key macroeconomic and nancial variables can be
reduced when the policy interest rate responds to changes in excess liquidity. Therefore, in
the case where there is a positive deviation in excess reserves, the central bank is likely to
respond by reducing the policy interest rate. A lower renance rate makes borrowing from
the central bank less costly and discourages banks from holding excess reserves. In the
second policy experiment we examine whether a countercyclical reserve requirement rule
can reduce uctuations in excess reserves. The ndings show that although the augmented
Taylor rule is successful in reducing volatility in real variables, the nancial variables of
the model become more volatile. The results from the countercyclical rule indicate that if
the reserve requirement ratio is used in a countercyclical fashion, it can help to stabilise
uctuations in excess reserves, but at the expense of ination and output being slightly
more volatile.
In this model, as well as in many other contributions in the literature (for instance,
Glocker and Towbin (2012)), an increase in reserve requirements is expansionary. Thus,
although raising reserve requirements helps to mitigate uctuations in reserves, it creates a
procyclical e¤ect. This implies that nancial stability may come at a cost of macroeconomic
stability. This therefore raises the question of the optimal combination of instruments
which will ensure that the objectives of macroeconomic stability and nancial stability are
achieved.
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Appendix A
Solution to Optimization Problems
Solutions to the optimization problems of the household
Substituting (2) in (1) subject to (4), the Lagrangian function for the household problem
can be written as,
LH = Et
1X
t=0
t
[Cht]
1  1
1   1 + N ln(1 Nht) + X ln[(M
H
ht )
D1 ht ] (A1)
+tf!tNht   Tht +MHht 1
Pt 1
Pt
+ (1 + iDt 1)Dht 1
Pt 1
Pt
+(1 + iBt 1)B
H
ht 1
Pt 1
Pt
+ JIht + 'hJ
B
t + J
K
t   Cht  MHht  Dht  BHhtg;
where t denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Let t+1 = (Pt+1   Pt) =Pt denote the ination
rate; maximizing (A1) with respect to Cht, Nht, MHht , Dht and B
H
ht, taking i
D
t , i
B
t , Pt, and
Tht as given yields the following rst order conditions,
Cht
 1= = t; (A2)
N
1
1 Nht   t!t = 0; (A3)
X
MHht
  t + Et( t+1
1 + t+1
) = 0; (A4)
X(1  )
Dht
  t + Et

t+1(
1 + iDt
1 + t+1
)

= 0; (A5)
Et(
t+1
1 + t+1
) =
t
1 + iBt
: (A6)
The transversality condition is given by,
lim
s!1Et+st+s
s(MHt+s) = 0: (A7)
Combining (A2) and (A6), the Euler equation is,
C
 1=
ht = Et

(Cht+1)
 1=(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
)

: (A8)
Using (A2) in (A3) and rearranging yields the supply of labour equation,
Nht = 1  N (Cht)
1=
!t
: (A9)
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Substituting (A6) in (A4) and using (A2) gives the demand for real cash balances,
MHht =
X(Cht)
1=(1 + iBt )
iBt
: (A10)
Combining (A6), (A5) and (A2), the real demand for bank deposits is,
Dht =
X(1  )(Cht)1=(1 + iBt )
iBt   iDt
: (A11)
Solutions to the optimization problems of the nal good-producing rm
The prot maximization problem of the nal good producer is given by,
max
Yjt
Pt
Z 1
0
[Yjt]
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
 
Z 1
0
PjtYjtdj: (A12)
The rst-order condition with respect to Yjt gives,
Pt
Z 1
0
Y
 1=
jt dj
1= 1
Y
 1=
jt   Pjt = 0:
Given that Y 1=t =
nR 1
0 [Yjt]
( 1)=dj
o1=( 1)
, this can be written as,
Yjt = (
Pjt
Pt
) Yt: (A13)
Equation (A13) gives the demand for each intermediate good j.
Using (A13) in the nal good production function (10), then making Pt the subject,
the nal good price can be denoted as,
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pjt)
1 dj
1=(1 )
: (A14)
Solutions to the optimization problems of intermediate good-producing rms
The rst-stage minimization problem for rm j is,
min
Njt;Kjt

(1 + W iRt )!tNjt + r
K
t Kjt

: (A15)
Minimizing (A15) subject to (14), the Lagrangian function for this problem is,
LIG = (1 + W iRt )!tNjt + rKt Kjt + t
h
Yjt  AtKjtN1 jt
i
; (A16)
where t denotes the Lagrange multiplier. The rst-order condition with respect to Njt
yields,
(1 + W iRt )!t = t(1  )
Yjt
Njt
: (A17)
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The rst-order condition with respect to Kjt gives,
rKt = 
Yjt
Kjt
t: (A18)
Combining (A18) and (A17) gives,
Njt =
(1  )

rKt
(1 + W iRt )!t
Kjt: (A19)
With Yjt = 1, the constraint (14) can be rewritten as 1 AtKjtN1 jt = 0. Using (A19)
in this gives,
Kjt = A
 1
t


(1  )
(1 + W iRt )!t
rKt
1 
: (A20)
From (A19) and (A20), Njt is,
Njt = A
 1
t


(1  )
 (1 + W iRt )!t
rKt
 
: (A21)
Combining (A20) and (A21) the capital-labour ratio is,
Kjt
Njt
= (

1  )[
(1 + W iRt )!t
rKt
]: (A22)
Combining (A17) and (A18) yields,
[(1  ) + ]t = t =

(1 + W iRt )!tNjt + r
K
t Kjt

Yjt
:
This implies that t is also equal to the unit real marginal cost, mcjt. Using (14) and
(A22) in this gives the unit real marginal cost as,
mcjt =

(1 + W iRt )!t
1 
(rKt )

(1  )1 At : (A23)
The second-stage optimization problem for the intermediate good producer is,
max
Pjt
Et
1X
t=0
tt
(
Pjt
Pt
1 
Yt  mcjt

(
Pjt
Pt
) Yt

 
"
F
2

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1
2
Yt
#)
: (A24)
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Taking mcjt, Pt and Yt as given, the rst-order condition with respect to Pjt is,
(1  )t

Pjt
Pt
  Yt
Pt
+ tmcjt

Pjt
Pt
  1 Yt
Pt
  tF

Pjt
Pjt 1
  1

Yt
Pjt 1
(A25)
+FEt
(
t+1

Pjt+1
Pjt
  1
 
Pjt+1
P 2jt
!
Yt+1
)
= 0:
Solutions to optimization problems of the capital good producer
The optimization problem of the capital good producer is given by,
max
Kt+1
Et
1X
t=0
tt
(
rKt Kt   (1 + iLt )
"
Kt+1   (1  )Kt + K
2

Kt+1
Kt
  1
2
Kt
#)
: (A26)
The rst-order condition with respect to Kt+1 is,
t+1r
K
t+1   t(1 + iLt ) + t+1(1 + iLt+1)(1  )
 (1 + iLt )tK

Kt+1
Kt
  1

Kt
Kt
  (1 + iLt+1)t+1
K
2

Kt+2
Kt+1
  1
2
+(1 + iLt+1)t+1K

Kt+2
Kt+1
  1

Kt+2
Kt+1
= 0:
Using some algebraic manipulations and substituting equation (A6) in this gives,
Etr
K
t+1 = (1 + i
L
t )Et

1 + K(
Kt+1
Kt
  1)

(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
)

(A27)
 Et
(
(1 + iLt+1)
"
(1  ) + K
2
[

Kt+2
Kt+1
2
  1]
#)
:
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Appendix B
Steady-State Equations
This section presents the steady-state values of the variables in the model. These values
are computed by dropping the time subscripts from the variables.
From (45), the policy rate in the steady state is,
iR = r +  + "1(   T ): (B1)
In the steady state, ination is equal to its target value. Thus,
 = T : (B2)
Using this result in (B1) gives the steady-state value of the renance rate,
iR = r + : (B3)
From equation (5), the steady-state value of the bond rate (which is equal to the real
interest rate) is,
1 + iB
1 + 
= 1 + r =
1

:
In the case where the ination target is equal to zero, there is zero ination in the
steady state,  = T = 0. Thus,
1 + iB = 1 + iR = 1 + r =
1

: (B4)
In the steady state, capital adjustment costs are zero,
K
2
(
K
K
  1)2K = 0: (B5)
Using (B5) in (25), total investment in the steady state is,
I = K: (B6)
From equation (49), the steady-state equilibrium condition of the goods market yields
Y = C + G + I: Using G =  Y from (48) and (B6) in this, the steady-state value of
consumption is given by,
C = (1   )Y   K: (B7)
Using (B5) in (28) gives the steady-state value of the rental rate of capital,
rK = [(1 + iB)  (1  )](1 + iL) > r: (B8)
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In the steady state, the total reserve ratio and excess reserve ratio from (39) are,
TR = +
[
 
1 + iM

+C1  
 
1 + iR

]
C2
; (B9)
ER =
 
1 + iM

+C1   (1 + iR)
C2
: (B10)
The ratio of excess reserves to total reserves is,
ER_TR =
 
TR   
TR
;
or,
ER_TR =
ER
TR
: (B11)
Total reserves in the steady state are,
TR =
 
+ ER

D: (B12)
From (40), the steady-state value of the deposit rate is,
1 + iD = (1 +
1
D
) 1[(1 + iR)  TR(iR   iM ) (B13)
+C1(
TR   )  C2
2
(TR   )2]:
Using (41), the steady-state value of the lending rate is given by,
1 + iL =
1 + iR
QF

 1L + 1
 : (B14)
The steady-state value of the repayment probability from (42) is,
QF = 0(
CK
LF;I
)1 : (B15)
In the steady state, the collateral-to-loan ratio is,
CL =
CK
LF;I
: (B16)
Using (B4) in (7), the steady-state value for real cash balances is,
MH =
XC
1=
1   : (B17)
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From (8), the steady-state value of real bank deposits is,
D =
X(1  )C1=(1 + iB)
iB   iD : (B18)
The steady-state value of labour supply from equation (6) is given by,
N = 1  NC
1=
!
: (B19)
From (14), output of intermediate goods is,
Y = AKN1 : (B20)
The capital-labour ratio in the steady state is,
K
N
= (

1  )[
(1 + W iR)!
rK
]: (B21)
Using (B4) and (B8) in (B21), the steady-state real wage is,
! =

1  


K

 1   (1  ) (1 + iL)
N
 
W 1
 : (B22)
In the steady state, the price adjustment equation (A25) is,
(1  ) + mc = 0:
From this, the steady-state value of the marginal cost is,
mc =
   1

: (B23)
From (15), the steady-state level of loans demanded by intermediate good producers is,
LF;W = W!N; (B24)
whereas, using (24), loans demanded by the capital good producer is,
LF;I = I: (B25)
Combining (B24) and (B25) total loans are,
LF = W!N + I: (B26)
From (37), the steady-state level of borrowing from the central bank is,
LB = LF   (1  TR)D: (B27)
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The money market equilibrium condition in the steady state is,
B
c
=MH +D: (B28)
From (47), taxes in the steady state are,
T = G+ iMTR+ iBB
H   iRLB: (B29)
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Appendix C
Log-Linearized Equations
The log-linearized equations of the model are presented in this section. Variables with
a hat represent percentage point deviations for interest rate variables, ination, the total
reserve ratio and the excess reserve ratio from the steady-state, and log-deviations around
a non-stochastic steady-state for the other variables.
Log-linearizing private consumption (equation (5)) gives,
EtC^t+1 = C^t + 
ciBt   Etbt+1 ; (C1)
where ^t+1 is dened as,
Etbt+1 = EtP^t+1   P^t: (C2)
Log-linearizing the demand for cash (equation (7)) gives,
M^Ht =
1

C^t  


1  
ciBt : (C3)
The demand for deposits from (8) is,
D^t =
1

C^t +
1 + iD
iB   iD
hciDt  ciBt i : (C4)
From (6), labour supply in log-linear form is,
N^t =
N (C)
1=
!   N (C)1=
(
!^t   C^t

)
: (C5)
From (17), labour demand can be derived as,
N^t = K^t   W {^Rt   !^t + (
1 + 
1 +     )r^
K
t : (C6)
Log-linearizing the rental rate of capital from (28) gives,
drKt+1 = (1 + iL)(1 + iB)1 + rK nciBt + biLt   dt+1 +K EtK^t+1   K^to (C7)
 (1 + i
L)
1 + rK
n
(1  )diLt+1 +KEt K^t+2   K^t+1o :
Log-linearizing equation (A25) gives the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
^t =
(   1)
F
cmct + Et^t+1: (C8)
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A log-linear approximation of the marginal cost, equation (18), yields,
cmct = (1  )(W {^Rt + !^t) + ( + 1 +     )r^Kt   A^t: (C9)
From (14), output of intermediate goods in log linear form is,
Y^t = A^t + (1  ) N^t + K^t: (C10)
From (39) the log-linearized total reserve ratio and excess reserve ratio are given by,
^TRt =
^t
TR
  (1 + i
R)( biRt )
C2 TR
; (C11)
^ERt =
 (1 + iR) biRt
C2 ER
: (C12)
The ratio of excess reserves to total reserves in log-linear form is,
\ER_TRt =
^TRt
ER_TR
  ^t
TR ER_TR
  ^TRt : (C13)
Total reserves are,
dTRt = 1
TR
n
^t + D^t

D +

^ERt + D^t

ERD
o
: (C14)
From (40), the deposit rate is given by,
ciDt = 1(1 + iD)(1 + 1D ) 1f 1  TR (1 + iR) biRt   TR^TRt (iR   iM ) (C15)
+

C1   C2
 
TR     TR^TRt   ^tg:
Log-linearizing the lending rate, equation (41), gives,
biLt = biRt   Q^Ft : (C16)
From (42), the repayment probability in log linear form is,
Q^Ft = 2Y^t + 1

K^t   L^F;It

: (C17)
The linearized equation for the collateral-to-loan ratio is given by,
dCLt = K^t   L^F;It : (C18)
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From (45), the central bank policy rate is determined by,
{^Rt = {^
R
t 1 + (1  )["1(^t) + "2(Y^t)] + t: (C19)
Using (15), total loans to intermediate good producers in log linear form can be written
as,
L^F;Wt = N^t + !^t; (C20)
whereas, the capital good producers demand for credit from (24) is,
L^F;It = I^t: (C21)
Log-linearizing equation (30), total loans to rms are,
L^Ft =
W!N
LF
h
N^t + !^t
i
+
II^t
LF
: (C22)
From (37), borrowing from the central bank is,
L^Bt =
LF L^Ft
LB
  D
LB
h
D^t   TRD^t   TR^TRt
i
: (C23)
Log-linearizing (52) gives the money market equilibrium, from which {^Bt is obtained,
MHM^Ht +DD^t = 0: (C24)
New capital goods from equation (25) is given by,
K^t+1 =
I
K
I^t + (1  ) K^t: (C25)
From (49), the log-linearized equation for the equilibrium condition of the goods market
is,
Y Y^t (1   ) = CC^t + KI^t: (C26)
Taxes from (47) are,
T T^t  GG^t = iMTR(dTRt 1   ^t) + hiBBC   (1 + iB)Bi ^t (C27)
+(1 + iB)(B  BC)diBt 1   LB  1 + iRdiRt 1   iRLB(L^Bt 1   ^t):
56
Appendix D
Table A1. Reserve Requirement Levels in Various Countries*
Country Required Reserve Ratios (%) (2012)
Australia None
Belize 8:5
Brazil 44**
Canada None
Cape Verde 18
China 20***
Croatia 13:5
Euro Area 1
Guyana 12
India 4:25
Jamaica 12
Malawi 15:5
New Zealand None
Nigeria 12
South Africa 2:5
Switzerland 2:5
The Bahamas 5
Trinidad and Tobago 17****
Turkey 11
United Kingdom None
United States 0  10
Source: Authors survey.
Notes: *Reserve requirement ratio refers to holdings of domestic currency liabilities; **Reserve
requirements on demand deposits; ***For large nancial institutions; ****Primary reserve
requirements.
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